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The purpose of this expulsion of Dr. Cassanovalas Garrido, is to thwart any effort to return to constitutional rule, which the State Department is properly insisting upon.

It is my hope, and that, I am convinced, of all freedom lovers and believers in the democratic process both at home and in Latin America, that our Government will adhere firmly to this position and never grant either recognition or aid of any kind to the usurping junta in the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican people are bitterly resentful of the overthrow of their government which brought to them the first breath of freedom after 31 years of tyranny, a fact which is not obscured by the now controlled press and slanted news items being released under the police state management of the usurping generals and colonels and their false facade of civilians.

Today, at the National Press Club, Enriquillo del Rosario, the Ambassador of the legal and constitutional Government of the Dominican Republic, made an address pointing out how tragic the situation is for the people of the Dominican Republic, and urging that the United States continue to insist on the return of law and order, constitutional government, and the democratic regime which was so ruthlessly overthrown.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the address by Ambassador Enriquillo del Rosario to the National Press Club be printed at this point in my remarks; together with two dispatches published in the New York Times for Thursday, October 31, 1963, entitled "Leaders Bar Policy Shift," and "Gains Seen by United States," which show that the usurping junta is not preparing to make any concession whatsoever and that the United States already sees some benefits from the policy of "no recognition" and will adhere to it.

There being no objection, the address and dispatches were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF ENRIQUILLO DEL ROSARIO, AMBASSADOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED STATES, AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, NOVEMBER 5, 1963

It is now 6 weeks since the democratically elected government of the Dominican Republic was overthrown by military force. And it is important to establish very clearly at this time how the Dominican people themselves feel about the coup d'état which terminated constitutional government in my country after only a few months' trial. It has been said that they were indifferent to this act, and that they are relatively content under the present government.

This is utterly untrue.

Never before in history have the Dominican people wanted democratic government and self-rule as deeply and as passionately as now. Being deprived of self-government by a military-dominated junta has made them even more aware than before of how precious democracy is to them. They are well aware that the illegal junta which has seized power in the Dominican Republic represents only a few wealthy men and ambitious officers, and that these people do not want any real democracy. And they are equally aware that any promises by the junta for a return to democratic government are cynical and insincere, entirely contrived to mislead people in the United States.

The Dominican people definitely want a return to constitutional government, and not in 2 years or even 6 months. They want it now. They are united in their contempt and distrust for the illegal junta. And despite the fears engendered by 32 years of living under a brutal police state, they have taken considerable risks to show their deep desire for return to democratic self-government.

Very few newspapers in the United States have given any idea of the scale and intensity of these antijunta feelings. But they are very revealing. Here is just a fraction of the evidence of what the Dominican people themselves are feeling and doing.

Over 90 percent of the professional leaders of the country have denounced the coup and are demanding a return to constitutional government. The doctors' association, the lawyers' association, the engineers' association, and the various teachers' associations have gone forcefully on record to this effect. These are obviously no radical hotheads; they are the educated, middle class, respected leaders of the country.

These professional groups have been joined by virtually all the labor unions and civic organizations in a demand for the dissolution of the junta and a return to constitutional government. Both university and secondary school students, moreover, have made repeated demonstrations in favor of democratic self-government.

It is no exaggeration to say that 90 percent of the people of the Dominican Republic are not only indignant, but increasingly indignant, at being deprived of their democratic rights. And they are fully determined, by whatever means, to regain their liberties and the right to have a government of their choice.

In the face of the growing desire to throw the junta out, the police and military have used threats, tear gas, and even bullets against demonstrators. They have started to fill the prisons again with prodemocrats, and have outlawed the basic rights of free assembly guaranteed by the Constitution. The usurpers still have the arms, but they know that the people are united as never before against them.

The recent imprisonment and forced exile of Dr. Juan Cassasnovas Garrido shows the junta's fear of any return to legality. Dr. Cassasnovas was the President of the Senate of the legitimate Government. In the absence of the legal President and Vice President, both of whom were forcibly expelled from the country, Dr. Cassasnovas was clearly designated by the Constitution and confirmed by the legislature as the legal successor to the Presidency. But the junta, fearful of any possible rallying point for reestablishing legal government, tracked down Dr. Cassasnovas last week, captured him, beat him, imprisoned him, then forced him into exile. The same junta which is trying to dupe public opinion in the United States by saying that it wants to prepare for a return to constitutional government, cynically throws out all persons who constitutionally are designated as the country's leaders.

In the last week, nonetheless, various European governments have recognized the junta. Let me say that this contrasts sharply with the fact that the Dominican people definitely do not recognize the junta, and this is the capital point. Sovereignty resides in the people. They alone have the right to determine who shall govern them and in what framework. It is this basic democratic right which is at stake, and for which the Dominican people are fighting.

As the lawful representative of the constitutional government of my country in the United States, let me add that the people of my country will not recognize or honor any commitments or agreements entered into by the illegal government which is tempo-

rarily in power. Any loans accorded to the junta, for example, will in no way obligate the people or their legitimate government, and will be undertaken at the risk of the lenders. The Dominican people have given no authorization whatsoever to the junta to undertake any fiscal or contractual obligations in their name.

The basic situation in the Dominican Republic is very clear. The people elected the first democratic government in 36 years by an overwhelming majority in free elections. In a few months after its installation, a military coup backed by a tiny handful of wealthy businessmen overthrew the legitimate government on the spurious grounds that it was encouraging communism and had allowed the government to be infiltrated by Communists.

Yet 6 weeks later, the junta has been unable to point out any Communists in the government. This was probably no surprise to them, but they were surprised to discover how united the people are in indignation at being deprived of their basic rights of self-government. And the junta has also been surprised that the U.S. Government has not recognized and supported them. They had deluded themselves into believing that the United States has a certain fondness for military dictatorships, a delusion shared by the Communists as well.

The Communist line has been that the United States withdrawal of recognition and economic aid is sheer hypocrisy, and that the United States secretly sympathizes with the military junta and will shortly find a formula for recognizing it. And they are waiting hopefully for such recognition as the basis to start a major propaganda campaign throughout Latin America to the effect that the United States really prefers military dictatorship, which is indifferent to the misery in Latin countries, over democratic government. It is with this big lie that the Communists hope to make Cubas of all Latin America.

Ironically, the junta and the Communists are now united toward the same objective. Both want the military junta to be recognized. The junta wants it in order to perpetuate the privileges of the wealthy few. The Communists want it as a weapon to destroy not only the reactionary forces, but also the democratic ones as well.

The next few weeks will probably be critical in my country. Pressure on the State Department to find a modus vivendi with the junta will probably increase. The junta will make periodic threats of impending chaos and Communist takeover if they are not backed. And they will continue to track down, imprison and exile all democratic leaders with a constitutional right to govern.

But the key fact is that the democratic forces are in an overwhelming majority among the people of my country, and it is their wishes which must be respected, not those of the present junta, who represent no one but their own selfish interests. In this calvary of democracy in one small Caribbean country, there is still very much at stake for the entire hemisphere. Democratic forces look to the United States for moral support, and are calling for that support. And it is unthinkable that the United States should—now or later—destroy the hopes of the democratic forces in the Dominican Republic and in other Latin American countries by recognizing the antidemocratic junta. This is not an indifferent minority calling for backing. It is the great majority, passionately wanting a return to democracy, which appeals to the American people not to let them down.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 31, 1963]

LEADERS BAR POLICY SHIFT

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, October 29.—The provisional Government of the Dominican Republic, operating under growing pressures of extreme rightwing ci-

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villian and military factions, has decided not to make political concessions as a price for recognition by the United States.

The present disposition of the Dominican ruling groups is to stand firm on the refusal to do anything to speed the return to the democratic process beyond the original promise of general elections more than 2 years from now.

Although the three-man civilian junta in nominal control of the country appeared to be inclined last week to allow presidential and congressional elections perhaps before the end of 1964, it has now become clear that the powerful military-supported rightist groups would not tolerate even such a concession to win quicker recognition.

In fact, the Dominican rulers are taking the position that the country can go on indefinitely without Washington's recognition and U.S. economic aid. Both were suspended last September 24, when the military ousted President Bosch from the presidency after 7 months in office.

The Kennedy administration indicated at the time that diplomatic relations, aid under the Alliance for Progress and military assistance would remain suspended until at least a semblance of the democratic process returned to the Dominican Republic. Dr. Bosch was the Dominican Republic's first freely elected President in 36 years.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the basic alternatives for the United States is to refuse recognition indefinitely, in the hope of stimulating internal change, or to restore full relations on Dominican terms, which would imply a capitulation by the Kennedy administration.

## TIES WITHOUT AID SUGGESTED

Some observers here believe, however, that the best solution would be a restoration of formal diplomatic relations, without a resumption of economic and military aid. Such a policy, these observers say, would maintain Washington's condemnation of the anti-Bosch coup, but at the same time would end what is becoming an untenable international situation.

Although the Dominican leadership has refused to make concessions as a price for recognition, its inability thus far in finding international acceptance is among the factors causing pressures from the rightist civilian and military groups that placed it in office.

The groups are also publicly finding fault with the leadership for its alleged failure to "eliminate Communists" from the administration and other sectors of national life. The reason given for the coup was that it would defend the country from communism.

Because the rightist groups' concept of what constitutes a Communist is extremely elastic, the Dominican leadership is increasingly faced with the choice of instituting a major purge—one that could lead to a breakdown of public administration—or finding itself replaced by a new, more responsible junta.

The leaders were criticized, in a letter published in local newspapers last week, for slowness in finding and ejecting Communists. The letter was from Dominican Independent Action, the civilian group principally responsible for pushing the military into the anti-Bosch coup.

A month after the end of the Dominican Republic's brief experiment in democracy, the country finds itself in the midst of growing confusion and dangers from both the right and the left. With rapid polarization, rightists as well as Communists and their allies are seeking to build up their forces for a showdown that many Dominicans fear may end in bloodshed.

## GAINS SEEN BY UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, October 30.—The administration believes that its refusal to recognize the de facto regimes of the Dominican Re-

public and Honduras is beginning to bear fruit.

The objective of this policy is to hasten the return to constitutional order in both countries.

U.S. officials reported today that the Dominican junta has indicated its willingness to negotiate the early restoration of democratic procedures.

## POLITICAL SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, almost overnight, the political situation in South Vietnam has changed, and our policy toward the new government of that country will change accordingly. The U.S. Government—both the executive branch and the Congress—has, since the severe repression of the Vietnamese students and Buddhists by the Diem government this summer, hoped for the creation of an atmosphere in South Vietnam which might regather popular support behind the war effort.

I think that the President has followed the correct course in relation to South Vietnam. Although we have favored reforms, we have left it entirely to the will of the Vietnamese to implement that reform. If they themselves had not so strongly desired the change, we would have seen no coup in South Vietnam. My one regret about the recent coup was the violent death of Diem and Nhu, and all others who fell in the fight.

It will be no easy task to reestablish a stable and effective government in South Vietnam, a government which can rally the Vietnamese people to victory over the Communist Vietcong guerrillas. However, I hope we will share in helping the leaders of the new Vietnamese Government to successfully prosecute the war against the Communists, so that the many Americans there can come home again.

The effects of our policy in South Vietnam were well summarized in an article by Warren Unna which appeared in the November 5 issue of the Washington Post. I ask unanimous consent to have this excellent article printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## BRIGHTER OUTLOOK: SAIGON COUP BOOSTS U.S. POLICY

(By Warren Unna)

The Kennedy administration's policy toward South Vietnam, despite all the cynical predictions of it being either nonexistent or negative, suddenly seems to emerge smelling like a rose.

As things stand now, South Vietnam even may lose its eligibility for becoming a whipping boy in next year's election campaign.

Last week's coup in Saigon accomplished two things:

1. South Vietnam gained a new government which now at least has a running chance of gaining the popular support needed not only to win the war against the Vietcong Communist guerrillas, but to keep the country stable enough to move forward once that war is won.

2. The United States which contributes \$1.5 million a day and some 16,500 military advisers toward helping South Vietnam in its war effort, managed to stand by its principles and encourage last week's coup without "playing God" and being its instigator.

As some of the Washington pundits observed, "CIA couldn't have been behind this; it worked too well."

More concrete proof of the U.S. innocence as instigator is the fact that one of the very key State Department officials concerned with South Vietnam was out of town at the time, enrolling his children in school in the South.

The Kennedy administration's policy toward South Vietnam was not always so clean cut and decisive. Until last May, it was governed by the fear that if this country didn't coddle President Ngo Dinh Diem and his all-powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, these headstrong leaders might scuttle a war which the United States, with its interest in defending the whole of southeast Asia, was desirous of winning.

The Kennedy administration also did not want to scare off the Diem-Nhu regime's backing of a strategic hamlet program which the United States was convinced would give rural Vietnam the protection from the Vietcong and the sense of identification from a caring central government necessary to win the war.

But, according to one U.S. policymaker, May 8 became the turning point. This was the date of the first massacre of Buddhists by government troops in Hue.

From May 8 on, the Kennedy administration became increasingly aware that its old policy of placating Diem and Nhu would get nowhere. These changes followed:

Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., who was sent to South Vietnam with explicit instructions to appease Diem in the hopes of restoring his confidence in the United States, was called home for reassignment.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, a big-name politician known for his bluntness, was sent out with instructions to use his head and stand up for things he believed in.

Lodge did just that. He suggested that Nhu be relieved of his duties; he openly countered Mrs. Nhu's criticism of U.S. soldiers; and he put an end to all of Nolting's obsequious visits to the palace.

President Kennedy in an extraordinary Labor Day TV interview, called for "changes in policy and perhaps with personnel"—an explicit encouragement to the Vietnamese military leaders who at that time had come to the United States asking for support if they attempted a coup.

The military leaders called off that earlier coup attempt. But the Kennedy administration, on its own, proceeded to suspend two vital economic aid programs to South Vietnam and cut off the \$3 million a year the CIA had been paying special forces troops whose anti-Communist efforts Nhu had redirected against his own Buddhists.

The apparent assassination of both Diem and Nhu reportedly was not in the cards. The administration believes the coup leaders' assertion that they risked three costly hours at the height of the rebellion in holding their fire on the palace in the hope that Diem and Nhu would accept their guarantee of safe conduct out of the country.

But after the white flag was flown and the trucks wheeled into the palace to pick up Diem and Nhu the coup leaders found they had been duped and that the brothers had escaped.

Yesterday the U.S. Embassy in Saigon was instructed to convey Washington's disapproval of the brothers' deaths.

The Kennedy administration is well aware that there is no such thing as an ideal government in South Vietnam. But now at least the United States can hope for working out mutual problems with a sovereign government more representative of its people.

## FUND TO HELP FINANCE EXPERT ASSISTANCE FOR INDIANS IN CASES BEFORE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, yesterday President Kennedy signed into law H.R. 3306, which establishes a fund

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but that does not belong in the basic research category.

The second advantage of a clearer separation of basic research from applied research, development, and testing would be in the clarification of our worries about duplication. Congress has very rightly been worried about the duplication of effort in the research and development sphere. Scientists equally correctly deny that there is any intentional duplication in basic research. Congress wishes to save money, and can very properly raise questions about duplication of developmental efforts in the programs of agencies that have overlapping responsibilities. But duplication of effort in basic research is a quite different matter. The scientist's own motivation, his reputation for originality, and the elaborate procedures that have been established for exchanging information about the research that is being undertaken in different laboratories, should constitute much better guarantees against unnecessary duplication than could be provided by any set of governmental regulations or congressional hearings.

Third, questions of overhead, of the kinds of reporting required, of the relative merits of grants versus contracts, and other problems of management would, I believe, be easier to agree upon if we took them up separately for basic research and for applied research and development than they have been when these have all been lumped together into an undifferentiated category.

Fourth, the Government supports science education in a variety of ways in order to have a continuing supply of people qualified in pure science and its applied fields, but there is a considerable amount of confusion in the process. For example, much of the money that is allotted for research purposes is, in fact, used for the advanced training of graduate students. I said earlier that education at this level consists largely of a research apprenticeship. A great number of the grants for basic research and many of those for applied research that are carried out in university laboratories include funds for graduate assistants. The money is usefully spent, and the training received by graduate students contributes to our future supply of scientists and engineers. But some of the issues are clouded, because money that appears in the budget for one purpose is expended for a related but nevertheless different purpose.

There are some major differences between the proper methods of support for science education at the graduate level and for science education for younger students. The budgets upon which Congress has to act include funds for both of these levels. But at no point in their consideration is there a clear separation between the two, and consequently there is never an opportunity for a clear decision as to how much money can appropriately go to each and the differences in arrangements that will most effectively foster each set of objectives.

Fifth, a clearer separation of the four areas of support that I have been discussing would make it easier to define the kinds of responsibility that can most appropriately be carried out by Congress, by the executive agencies, and by the scientists who are ultimately responsible for the research and educational activities that are being supported. The lines are not completely sharp, but I would suggest that Congress and the Office of the President have primary responsibility for deciding what the total budget shall be and how it should be divided among these four broad areas. Within the area of development, testing, and associated applied research, Congress and the Office of the President also have primary responsibility for subdividing funds, for here are involved specific national goals—for defense, for public health, for our activities in space, for in-

dustry, agriculture, and for national prestige. On the other hand, the cognizant agencies, such as the National Science Foundation or the National Institutes of Health, and their grantees have a better basis for deciding how money for basic research should be spent and how money for the advanced and graduate education of prospective scientists should be spent. Confusion, mistrust, and a considerable amount of wasted effort result when either group tries to make decisions that might better be made by the other. In his testimony a few days ago, Dr. Wiesner spoke of the great speed with which a new finding in science may alter a variety of research activities. When this happens, a great deal of time can be wasted by going through a lot of bureaucratic red-tape to secure permission to alter the direction of a study or to secure a piece of equipment the need for which was not foreseen when the proposal was originally submitted.

Congress and the Office of the President have great and overriding responsibilities for the health of the Nation's research and development effort. They need not and should not dilute that responsibility by attempting to exercise a kind of control in one area that is only appropriate in some other area, or by attempting to make detailed research decisions which they are not truly qualified to make. Who is responsible for what would be easier to decide if we were thinking separately about these four parts of the total research and development effort than if we try to establish rules and procedures for all of our research and development activities.

Consequently, it seems to me altogether desirable that the subcommittee take up seriously and in depth the general question of the relationships between government and science. I believe that you can take up these questions most constructively if the four areas that I have discussed are looked at one at a time to see what their problems are and how those problems can best be solved.

## GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH FUNDS

The second general problem that I would like to discuss is closely related to the first. The problem is that of the geographic distribution of Federal research funds.

The facts are perfectly clear and are a matter of record for each agency. A few States get a great deal more money than do all the rest. In general, the States that get the most money for research are such populous States as California, Massachusetts, and New York, but even on a per capita basis the disparities among the States are tremendous. Whether the distribution is what it ought to be has been and no doubt will continue to be subject to a good deal of argument. A considerable part of the argument has been confused and confusing because we have been trying to use the same money for objectives that in the short run are mutually contradictory. In the abstract, most people would, I believe, agree that it is desirable that research be done on a variety of problems and that the research be of as high quality as we can procure. In the abstract, I believe also that most people would agree that it would be desirable to have a larger number of research and educational institutions of high quality, and that such institutions should be located in various parts of the country instead of being concentrated in a few locations.

In practice, there has been conflict between these two objectives. The need for defense, the fear of possible attack, the desire to ameliorate or even eradicate crippling and disabling diseases, and the desire to achieve other national goals as rapidly as possible have all argued in the direction of placing research grants and contracts with those institutions that are best qualified to conduct the desired research. There are not

many such institutions. Consequently there has been a pile-up of Federal research funds in a relatively small number of our best qualified universities. In order to fulfill their obligations, these universities have recruited competent scientists from other universities and colleges, and so there has been further concentration of research talent in the best institutions. From time to time, this system has been criticized and the claim advanced that research funds should be more broadly allocated among the 50 States. The concentrated distribution has often seemed necessary in the past. The urgency of attaining some of the goals we have had in mind would have made anything like an equal distribution among the 50 States a serious mistake.

But this situation has posed a dilemma for Congress, one that was illustrated—to take a single example—by the hearings of a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives earlier this year. In reviewing the 1964 budget of the National Science Foundation, officers of the National Science Foundation were criticized several times for what members of the subcommittee considered undue concentration of NSF funds in a few States. The same hearings, however, resulted in striking out of the NSF budget the funds that had been requested for developmental grants that would have enabled NSF to assist a number of universities to attain greater research competence, and thus on merit to secure a larger proportion of funds handled through the regular grant procedures of the National Science Foundation and other agencies.

We cannot let down our guard, but I suggest that we have reached a stage where we can do some longer range planning, and that it would now be appropriate to allot some funds specifically for research support with selection to be made strictly on grounds of quality, as has been the policy of the agencies in the past, and to allot some funds specifically for the purpose of building up a broader base of high-quality institutions scattered throughout the land.

Here clearly is a matter of high policy for the Congress and the President's Office. The change of policy would recognize that there is now an overemphasis on research at the expense of teaching and an overemphasis upon short-time research goals at the expense of a broadened research competence.

When the establishment of the National Science Foundation was first being debated in Congress, consideration was given to the possibility of allotting some portion of its funds—perhaps 25 percent—among the several States on a formula basis and of allotting 75 percent strictly on the basis of merit. This proposal was killed, partly because the pork-barrel label got attached to it, but the objective is still desirable. I propose, therefore, that the Government's total objective in supporting science would be better served if immediate research competence were not the only criterion for the distribution of funds and if some grants for research and for the improvement of science education were to be made either on a formula basis or by selection of especially promising institutions with the intent to develop first-class institutions in parts of the country in which they do not now exist.

To the extent that Federal funds can be used to accomplish this purpose, it will be necessary to use a larger fraction of that money than we have been using in past years in the form of institutional grants rather than individual project grants, and it will be necessary frankly to recognize the desirability of placing a larger amount of the total budget into universities that have the potential of reaching top rank but that have not yet done so, for it is in our longrun interest to have top-quality universities and research

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laboratories widely placed throughout the country.

All in all, as a long-range problem, I would list the matter of arriving at a better adjustment between the immediate, short-term research goals and the long-term goal of attaining a broadened national educational and research competence as one of the most fundamental and important problems in the area of Government-science relations.

#### NATURE OF THE AAAS

I shall turn now to the second topic that I was asked to discuss, the nature of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the ways in which it might help the Congress to fulfill its obligation to study and review legislative matters that are influenced by or that have an influence upon science and science education.

Just as the American Bar Association is the large, national, voluntary society of lawyers in the United States, so the American Association for the Advancement of Science is the large, national, voluntary society of scientists. The association was established 115 years ago. It now has 90,000 members. It covers all fields of science: astronomy, mathematics, physics and chemistry, the various fields of biology, agriculture, medicine, psychology, and the social sciences. While we have sections in all of these fields, provide for meetings covering all fields, and publish papers and technical symposia in all, most of our attention is devoted to matters that concern science as a whole, that involve several different fields of science, or that deal with questions of science education. In the last 8 or 9 years, we have been devoting a good deal of time and energy to problems of science education.

We hold national and regional meetings each year. Occasionally we are responsible for international scientific congresses. And we have a number of publications dealing with science, science education, and the public understanding of science.

As a matter of general policy, we rarely take formal positions on public issues. This is not because of lack of interest, but rather because we think we can be of greater service by providing an open forum for their analysis and discussion than we could by trying to decide upon the right answer in each case. Once in a while there is an exception. For example, from 1946 to 1950 we tried very hard to persuade the Congress and the country that it would be a good thing to establish the National Science Foundation. But in general we do not try to influence legislation or national policy by taking a position on one side of an issue.

Instead, we provide a forum for debate and discussion. This is done at annual meetings. It is also done, on a continuing basis, through the weekly magazine *Science* which we publish. Editorials, news, and news analyses concerning pending legislation, programs, and decisions of the executive agencies, and other political, economic, and social actions and forces that have a bearing on science or upon which scientific activities have a bearing are published regularly in *Science*. These are very widely read in the scientific community and have a fair readership among governmental policymakers. A fast printing schedule enables *Science* to reach the scientific community very rapidly; the editorial staff finished writing last night or even today the news and comment material that will be printed and mailed tomorrow in this week's issue of *Science*.

A second way in which we have attempted to serve a useful role is through the publication of analyses of problems that arise in the interaction between science and public affairs. As an example, several years ago there was considerable interest in the possibility of establishing a Cabinet-level Department of Science or Department of Sci-

ence and Technology. We collected half a dozen knowledgeable people who held different ideas about this possibility, kept them together for 3 days of intensive discussion, and as a result published in *Science* an analysis that did not try to give a simple yes or no answer to the question of whether there should be such a department of government, but instead laid out the issues, discussed the pros and cons, and tried to analyze the probable effects of the several proposals that were then current.

As another example, in 1952 we published a book reviewing the status of work in the various fields of science in Soviet Russia. This was before there was any general concern over a race with the Russians, and it has since become much easier to get information about what the Russians have been doing. But at the time, it served as a widely useful source book of information about Russian scientific work. More recently we have done the same thing for Communist China. In 1960 we set a group of American and Chinese-American scholars the task of reviewing all of the Chinese journals and scientific reports that were available in the United States. The amount of material for the decade of the 1950's was extensive, but since then the flow of information from Communist China has been substantially curtailed. We published the result in 1961, and it is still the best available source of information about what the Communist Chinese are doing in geophysics, medicine, and a variety of other fields.

The magazine *Science* and analyses such as those I have described are primarily intended for scientists. They are read by others, but in the main they reach a scientific audience. I want, therefore, to mention three ways in which we might be of more direct help to the Congress. Whether the suggestions I am going to make would be helpful is something I hope you will discuss. The extent to which we could do these other things that you might propose is something that I would want to discuss with the association's board of directors, for there are limits on what an organization that has a limited staff and that is primarily supported by the annual dues of its members can promise to do.

Several recent bills have advocated the establishment of a group of scientific staff members or science consultants to work with Congress and its committees. If such a congressional office is established, the staff will certainly not be large enough to handle all questions by itself. Help from outside will be needed, just as you have indicated that the existing committees need help.

One possibility for us would be to serve as a source of information about advisers. It is always difficult and sometimes impossible to get advisers who are well informed about a matter and who are not involved either as recipients of Government grants or as advisers to executive agencies. But we know the scientists of the country, and perhaps as well as anyone else could arrange to get well-qualified advisers on a variety of scientific matters of concern to congressional committees.

A second possibility is through the seminar mechanism. The Committee on Science and Astronautics has its own panel of advisers that meets periodically. In a quite different fashion, we have held, jointly with the Brookings Institution, several series of seminars for an invited group of Members of the House of Representatives. Mr. DADDARIO and Mr. MOSKOW, I am told, have been regular participants in those seminars. Each seminar has dealt with a specific area of research. The purpose in all cases has been educational and deliberately has not dealt with pending legislation. But if a committee wishes, we could arrange for a speaker

or a panel of scientists to discuss the scientific background or the probable implications of a problem with which the committee was concerned. The discussions might be held here and constitute part of the record, or they might be held in a more informal atmosphere at our building and be off the record. The British have had considerable success, and also some problems, with a standing committee consisting in part of Members of Parliament and in part of scientists. The Parliamentary and Science Committee meets periodically to discuss matters that are to come before Parliament. I do not think that a standing committee would be the best arrangement here, but perhaps it would be useful to arrange some ad hoc joint meetings that would serve a similar purpose.

As a third possibility, it may at times be possible for us to carry out analyses or studies that would be of use. Problems of air pollution are beginning to become of general concern and have long been of concern to some local areas, notably Los Angeles. The atmosphere is one of our most precious natural resources, and we have been doing a number of things to it that may irrevocably alter its character and its value. For the past 2 years the association has had a group of physicists, chemists, economists, urban planners, and public health specialists, with the help of a small staff, conducting a study of this important problem. We will have the report ready for publication next year.

As another example, last month we published in Spanish and later this fall will publish in English a review of American experience in the handling of arid land problems. We published the Spanish version first because it constituted the U.S. contribution to the Latin American Congress on Arid Lands that was held with UNESCO assistance in Argentina last month.

Both these studies of the atmosphere and of arid lands were planned and written not with any particular legislative or congressional problem in mind, but rather as efforts to bring together the available information on an important matter of public concern. I hope that they will be widely useful. They might have been of more direct use to you had we discussed with you your interest in such matters before we started the two studies.

As an example of how such discussions in advance might be useful, I refer again to the problem of geographic distribution of Federal support for scientific research and for science education. These are questions of obvious concern to Congress. They are matters that affect the operating policies of a number of Government agencies. And they are of great importance to the educational institutions of the country.

Obviously the suggestions I have made would by no means wholly solve the problem of giving Congress the competence it seeks in handling scientific and technical problems. But if, after you and the staff have had an opportunity to consider these and other ideas, it appears that the association can be of real assistance, we will be glad to continue the discussion of directions in which we might help.

#### VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for not to exceed 6 minutes and at the conclusion of my remarks to have printed a statement I made on the Vietnam uprising on November 1.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the recent events in Vietnam are tragic

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events. It is tragic that a leader who began by accomplishing so much that was constructive with so little, that a Government which began with so much promise, in the end crumbled in military coup and violent death, a situation which I deeply and personally regret.

When news of these events first reached this city, it seemed to me that their primary significance to the United States was clear. They were a clarion call for a reassessment of U.S. policies with respect to Vietnam and southeast Asia. For the government which fell, up until a few months ago, had been generally regarded for years, I so felt, as indispensable in the structure of American policy in southeast Asia. We will fail to heed this call only at the risk of great danger to the future of our relations with all of Asia.

We will not serve the interests of the Nation if:

First. We regard the overthrow of the Diem government as a victory or defeat for this country. It is neither. It is more an inexorable development in the tragic postwar history of the Vietnamese people.

Second. If we reassume that the successor military-dominated regime is an automatic guarantee of a permanent improvement in the situation in Vietnam. This successor authority in Vietnam is, at this point, at best a promise of something better. But if the Korean experience is at all relevant, it is apparent that such promises can be undone in short order.

If these tragic events of the past few days are to have constructive significance for this Nation as well as for the Vietnamese people, we would be well advised to recognize that the effectiveness of our Asian policies cannot be measured by an overthrow of a government, by whether one government is "easier to work with" than another; by whether one government smiles at us and another frowns. In the last analysis, the effectiveness of our policies and their administration with respect to the Vietnamese situation and, indeed, all of southeast Asia can only be weighed in the light of these basic questions:

First. Do these policies make possible a progressive reduction in the expenditures of American lives and aid in Vietnam?

Second. Do these policies hold a valid promise of encouraging in Vietnam the growth of popularly responsible and responsive government?

Third. Do these policies contribute not only to the development of internal stability in South Vietnam but to the growth of an environment of a decent peace and a popularly based stability throughout Asia—the kind of environment which will permit the replacement of the present heavy dependence upon U.S. arms and resources with an equitable and mutual relationship between the Asian peoples and our own?

This is, indeed, an appropriate time, Mr. President, for the executive branch to reassess policies for Vietnam and southeast Asia in these terms. It may well be that few changes, if any, are required at this time. But if that is the case—if indeed the problem in Vietnam

has been primarily one of an inadequate government—then, Mr. President, we should begin to see results in the period ahead. We should see:

First. A reduction in the commitment of U.S. forces and aid in Vietnam and southeast Asia;

Second. The emergence in Vietnam of a responsible and responsive civilian government attuned to the needs and reasonable aspirations of its people;

Third. An improvement in the relations of Vietnam with Cambodia and Laos;

Fourth. A growth in mutual commercial, cultural, and other friendly intercourse between the people of this Nation and the various Asian people.

These are basic tests, Mr. President, and it remains to be seen how they shall be met not only in our relations with the successor authority in Saigon but with all the nations of southeast Asia. From the point of view of this Nation, it would appear appropriate to reiterate at this time what the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL] and the Senator from Delaware [Mr. BOOGS] will recall that we stated on our return from a visit to Vietnam and southeast Asia less than a year ago:

It must be clear to ourselves as well as to the Vietnamese where the primary responsibility lies in this situation. It must rest, as it has rested, with the Vietnamese Government and people. What further effort may be needed for the survival of the Republic of Vietnam in present circumstances must come from that source. If it is not forthcoming, the United States can reduce its commitment or abandon it entirely but there is no interest of the United States in Vietnam which would justify, in present circumstances, the conversion of the war in that country primarily into an American war, to be fought primarily with American lives. It is the frequent contention of Communist propaganda that such is already the case. It should remain the fact that the war in Vietnam is not an American war in present circumstances.

That conclusion, Mr. President, in my judgment, would apply to the successor government in Saigon no less than to its predecessor.

## EXHIBIT 1

## STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

The news of the uprising in Vietnam came as a complete surprise to me, and I am quite certain a surprise to the administration. There have been rumors, of course, for weeks that a coup d'état was in the making, but there was nothing tangible to reinforce such an assumption up to this time.

This appears to me to be a purely Vietnamese affair which the Vietnamese should settle among themselves. As far as this Government is concerned, it is my opinion that the events of the past several hours call more than ever for a reassessment and reappraisal of our policy in South Vietnam and, for that matter, in all of southeast Asia.

One would hope that the people of South Vietnam will obtain the kind of government, out of these tragic developments, which will be responsive to their needs and responsible to them. It remains to be seen whether such a government shall emerge, and in any reappraisal of our policies this would be a factor of the utmost importance.

I have always had the highest respect for the integrity, the patriotism, and dedication of President Ngo Dinh Diem and regret deeply and personally, very much that the situation has had to come to such a pass.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise to strongly endorse the statement of the very wise Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD]. There is no Member of this body and few in the United States who know and understand that area and its people as well as he. I had the privilege of being with him on his last trip to Vietnam, and would like to underline his thought that these are days of decision for the people of Vietnam. They can make up their minds to go along the democratic path we have hoped they will follow, or they can follow the paths of other countries in the Far East, of which Korea would be an example. The Vietnamese have seen what happens when a country does not enjoy the regard or respect of her people—the people will eventually toss out the government. On the other hand, if the government enjoys the respect and regard of the people, the people embrace it and it remains in power. We hope this lesson will not be lost on the new Government of Vietnam. We also hope that Government will not lean too heavily on the United States, as our eventual goal remains not only the restoration of Vietnamese freedom from authoritarianism, no matter whether Communist or otherwise, but the reduction of our manpower and financial commitment in South Vietnam.

Mr. BOOGS. Mr. President, I was in the Chamber when the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana [MR. MANSFIELD] made what I consider to be a very comprehensive and important statement concerning the situation in Vietnam.

I recognize in the very able majority leader a man of great wisdom and a student of foreign affairs and of the southeast Asia area. I thought his statement was considerate not only of past developments in South Vietnam and the southeast Asia area, but also one looking hopefully toward the future with the best interests of freedom loving people and the people of South Vietnam and the southeast Asia area in mind.

His statement deserves the attention of all of us, and especially of our executive department, and those concerned with the problems in that part of the world.

I take this opportunity to express my support of the views and thoughts so well presented by the very able and distinguished majority leader.

## GEORGE F. KENNAN'S VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President some comments were made on the floor of this body relating to an article about Mr. George Kennan. Several articles were written. I ask unanimous consent that at the end of my remarks, an article from Look magazine of November 19, by J. Robert Moskin, be included in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not agree with some of the comments made by Mr. Kennan. I have regarded him, and still do, as one of the outstanding public servants of this country. I think he was, and is, uniquely qualified

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to comment on various aspects of our foreign policy, particularly on that part relating to our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He was in the Foreign Service for 25 or 30 years. He was acknowledged as one of the leading experts on Russia. He spoke the language well. He was sent there as a very young man specifically to learn Russian. He was our Ambassador to Russia. He had the distinction, if one wishes to call it that, of having his recall requested by the Soviet Government for remarks he made that were considered by the Kremlin as being critical of the situation in Berlin, I believe. This was about 10 years ago.

I believe everyone acknowledges that he has wide experience and knowledge of conditions in that part of the world and of our relations there.

I regret that anyone should criticize his efforts to enlighten the American people and Members of this body about our relations with Yugoslavia specifically, or Eastern Europe generally, or with the Kremlin.

His views are deserving of great weight. I would certainly not say they were infallible, but there is no more thoughtful man or student of our relations with Eastern Europe and Russia in or out of government.

He has resigned. He has a private capacity now. He is entitled to speak as any other citizen is. The only difference is that he speaks about his special field of study from knowledge and experience that are virtually unique among all the citizens of this country.

I believe the statements he made in this article are on the whole correct. I predict that history will prove that many of the suggestions that have been made regarding our policy with respect to the Soviet Union will prove to have been wise ones.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I ask unanimous consent that I may have 1 more minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Several years ago Mr. Kennan became well known for an article in Foreign Affairs, written by "Mr. X"—I believe that was the pseudonym. It was considered as the origin of the policy of containment. Subsequent to that, a new policy of liberation theoretically was developed, which has not proved as effective. I think the actual state of affairs is much closer, and has been, to that of containment rather than liberation.

He also has given noted lectures on Western Europe regarding our policies in that area, which, while they have not been followed, and were roundly condemned by former Secretary Acheson, may prove in the future to have had considerable wisdom.

In any case, I for one wish to commend Mr. Kennan for taking the trouble to give the public his views. I regard him as one of the outstanding public servants of our time.

## EXHIBIT 1

## OUR FOREIGN POLICY IS PARALYZED

(Note.—Respected diplomat, Russian expert, and Pulitzer Prize historian, George F. Kennan, has quit as President Kennedy's

Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Now free to speak out boldly, he warns that "overmilitarization" of our cold war thinking and fear of the "powerful influence of the right wing" are destroying our strength abroad.

(By J. Robert Moeskin)

"Congress and the American people are so divided that American leadership is indecisive. It is high time we clarified our ideas, as a nation and a government, as to what we want in our contest with the Soviet Union and the rest of the Communist world: Whether we want these countries to change, to capitulate to our desires, or whether we want war. People who hold all these three points of view have influence in Washington."

This warning comes from George F. Kennan, long time expert on communism, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and to Yugoslavia, and a prime architect of the Marshall plan. It is a rare event when a top-rank diplomat like Kennan, who has served 29 years in the Foreign Service, breaks loose from the establishment and speaks out on America's foreign policy failings.

Kennan, 59, has fought for his convictions against Democrats and Republicans alike. He opposed Democratic Secretary of State Dean Acheson's German policy and was once fired by Republican Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for disagreeing with his talk of the "liberation" of Eastern Europe. Now, Kennan has resigned as President Kennedy's Ambassador to Communist Yugoslavia because, he feels, the Congress and Washington bureaucracy had him hogtied and have crippled American foreign policy.

After a lifetime in diplomacy (he was sent to the Soviet Union as soon as we recognized its existence in 1933), this tall, lean, imposing man sits now in his still bookbare office at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J., clasps and unclasps his hands, jumps up and paces the small room, peers out the window—as he struggles to say precisely what the American people should know about the state of their Nation abroad.

In essence, he holds: We are fumbling because we have not made up our minds what kind of world we want, or what our role in the world should be. The administration is zeroed in on political victory at home, enmeshed in bureaucratic redtape and buffeted by political cyclones that roar in from many directions. It sacrifices thought-out policies to pressures often inspired by "the powerful influence of the American right-wing." Kennan fears that unless we nail down what we want our foreign policy to be, we will plummet to the ground in wing-clipped futility, or plunge into the flames of war.

"If we can't devise solutions better than this, we should ask ourselves whether we belong in the big leagues," Kennan warns. Indecisiveness at the top leads to a sterility of ideas and a failure to act. As a result, he argues, our foreign policy is paralyzed. A politician, whether in the White House or the Congress, who voices new ideas or acts with firmness in foreign affairs, must always protect his political life against extremists who talk loudly, but carry a very small stick of responsibility.

Kennan sees three forces paralyzing our foreign policy. The first is the Congress, in which a few powerful men—such as some leaders of the House Ways and Means Committee—tie up foreign policy. Some have strong notions about what the Government should be doing; others fear attacks from the extremists; some speak for special interests or jealously hug their prerogatives as holders of the Nation's purse strings. There is no reason to believe Kennan says, that their views represent American opinion more accurately than the President's.

The second force is the deadening hand of Government bureaucracy. As an Ambassador, Kennan found "the great difficulty was to get opinion and authority out of

Washington, especially when it cost money." The bureaucracy cannot react to changes fast enough. "Other countries find they are protected by our own financial procedures," he says. "The ponderousness of our Government institutions works against our best interest."

The third force Kennan sees crippling our foreign policy is the self-interest of our allies. "This coalition is incapable of agreeing on any negotiated solutions except unconditional capitulation and the satisfaction of the maximum demands of each of our allies. It is easier for a coalition to agree to ask for everything but the kitchen sink, rather than take a real negotiating position.

"This worries me because there is not going to be any capitulation. Our adversaries are not that weak. If we cannot find any negotiating position, the cold war will continue, and the dangers will not decrease."

The Russians may not accept our proposals, "but unless you dangle something before them, you put no pressure on their decisionmaking."

Kennan sees no New Frontier in foreign affairs. "The Kennedy administration is not by any means a free agent in foreign policy. I can see important changes in military policy. But in foreign policy, the administration has had little latitude of action.

"Supposing these strictures did not exist and the Congress were more receptive? I believe we could usefully rethink our position on the problems of Germany and Central Europe. The same applies to the complex of problems surrounding Communist China, Taiwan, and the Japanese peace treaty. We ought to review carefully our attitude toward Gen. Charles de Gaulle and see whether, under his concepts, France could not assume more of the burden of leadership in Western Europe and protection of Western Europe against Communist pressures. There ought to be searching reexamination and clarification of our policy toward Eastern Europe. The same applies to the various neutralist countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

"Finally, there must be a real debate and clarification of our views on the problems of nuclear weapons. It seems dangerous to me that we should have to continue to stagger along with unresolved differences such as we have just witnessed in the debate on the test ban treaty."

To illustrate how such forces paralyze our foreign policy, Kennan explains why he resigned from the State Department: "I had no difficulty with the administration, but the actions which the Congress designed to tie the administration's hands in our economic relations with Yugoslavia—and in a way that would deny the Yugoslavs normal commercial treatment—largely paralyzed my effectiveness there. If I had greater support on the congressional side, and felt there were important possibilities for accomplishment, my decision might have been different."

Although the United States had millions of dollars in the bank in Yugoslavia, Kennan spent months getting congressional approval even to repair the Embassy fence. "The jealous and narrow ways in which these matters are handled have to be changed."

Last July 26, an earthquake destroyed the Yugoslav city of Skopje, killing and injuring thousands. He has bitter memories: "The congressional strictures were so severe that we didn't know how we could help. The only thing I could do was give blood. No congressional committee could stop me from doing that."

Last year, the Congress directed the President to stop, as soon as practicable, normal most-favored-nation trade with any country dominated or controlled by communism. "The Yugoslavs aren't even asking aid," Kennan says. (They stopped taking military assistance from the United States in 1957.) "They just want normal commercial treatment, and the Congress won't give it to them. That's very bad."